According to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the term "penny stock" generally refers to low-priced securities of small companies (securities with prices that are less than $5.00 per share). At the end of 2010, 1,054 penny stocks were listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX, currently known as NYSE MKT LLC), and National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ).
The negative connotations of penny stocks are well-known.
In fact, the pejorative perceptions that are associated with penny stocks include (but are hardly limited to) the following issues: the extreme illiquidity and high volatility of these securities; "pump and dump" and "short and distort" schemes; the propensity of these stocks to be involved in e-mail spams and other types of internet fraud; attempts to sell penny stocks through boiler-room operations involving cold calls; and the reputation of these stocks as gambling-like investments. Many websites and newsletters that promote investment in penny stocks even claim that they can help investors make enormous returns of 500% or even 1000% in a short period of time.
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A careful review of SEC's prior announcements about penny stocks suggests that market regulators are more concerned about "unlisted" penny stocks that are traded in the over-thecounter (OTC) market, particularly stocks that are quoted in the Pink Sheets and Bulletin Board (OTCBB), than about listed penny stocks. 2 As a result, a number of academic papers investigate various issues that relate to OTC penny stocks. These studies may be grouped into four broad categories: (i) market manipulation [Hanke and Hauser (2008) ; Bӧhme and Holz (2006) Beatty and Kadiyala (2003) ]. Two recent studies [Ang et al. (2013) and Eraker and Ready (2014) ] also focus on the pricing aspect of a comprehensive set of over-the-counter (OTC) stocks. Ang et al. (2011) find that the cross sectional return patterns of OTC stocks and listed stocks are similar. They also report that the premiums that are associated with value/growth and size dimensions of OTC stocks are consistent with the corresponding premiums of exchange-traded stocks; however, the illiquidity premium of OTC stocks reaches 19.2% which is significantly greater than the illiquidity premium of 1.1% for comparable listed stocks. Eraker and Ready (2014) calculate an average return of -32% for OTC stocks, which cannot be explained by the traditional valuation models.
Because "listed" stocks that are traded for less than $5.00 per share are also called penny stocks, these stocks suffer from the same types of degradation as unlisted penny stocks. To maintain their listing status, any "listed" stocks must file their financial reports with the SEC.
These stocks must also meet the listing maintenance requirements (most notably, a minimum quantity of net assets and a minimum number of shareholders) that are imposed by their stock exchanges. 3 With the exception of the stocks with jeopardized listing statuses due to financial distress, these listed pennies should not be maligned. Third, the average short interest ratio (shares short divided by shares outstanding) for listed pennies amounts to 13%. 4 Considering the median short interest ratios of NYSE-and NASDAQlisted stocks range from 10% to 20% (Asquith et al., 2005) , short interest of listed pennies is not small, contradicting the general perception that investors have very little interest in shorting pennies.
In addition to the above three little-known facts, listed penny stocks are well-known for:
(i) large transaction costs causing extreme illiquidity; and (ii) high idiosyncratic volatility. Our estimate of the Corwin and Schultz (2012) measure of spread is 2.57% for listed pennies whereas our estimate of all sample stocks' (excluding pennies) spread is 0.91%. We address this question as we proceed to follow four distinct steps: first, we examine the characteristics of these penny stocks and compare them with those of comparable, low-priced non-penny stocks; second, we identify the factors in the framework of the asset pricing model that can explain penny stock returns; third, we further examine the impact idiosyncratic volatility, short interest, and institutional ownership in explaining the profitability of penny stock portfolios in the five-factor asset pricing framework. Finally we highlight limits-to-arbitrage to justify overand/or undervaluation of penny stocks.
Our results are summarized as follows. Consistent with general perceptions, penny stocks typically exhibit small market capitalization, high beta, high idiosyncratic volatility, high BM ratio, poor liquidity, and high transaction costs. Only when the illiquidity factor is added to the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model and the Fama-French-Carhart (1997) four-factor model, the abnormal returns of penny stocks become insignificant. We further examine whether investors can make abnormal profits from penny stocks by employing the zero-cost investment strategies instead of holding long positions in all penny stocks. Three major characteristics are considered for this purpose: idiosyncratic volatility, institutional ownership, and short interest.
Motivated by observed profitability generated by the three characteristics, we focus on limits-toarbitrage to explain the profitability of investments in penny stocks.
The paper is organized as follows: Section I identifies the distinct characteristics of penny stocks relative to non-penny stocks. Section II examines whether penny stocks yield higher returns than non-penny stocks in the context of one-to five-factor models. Section III investigates how three characteristics common to penny stocks affect their abnormal returns. Section IV analyzes the impact of limits-to-arbitrage on the valuation of penny stocks. Section V presents conclusions.
I. Characteristics of Penny Stocks

A. Data
CRSP is the source of the price data that are used in this study, which include the daily and monthly NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stock returns from July 2001 to December 2010.
Because penny stock returns are sensitive to the minimum tick size, we conduct our study in the post-decimalization period, which involves price quotations in one penny increments. COMPUSTAT is the source of the accounting data for individual stocks. For each firm, we match all of the data for the fiscal year that ends in calendar year t-1 with the returns from July of year t to June of t+1. This matching scheme allows stock returns to be explained by accounting variables with a degree of time lag. In particular, we use a firm's market equity at the end of December of year t-1 to compute its BM ratio for year t-1, and we match this ratio to the returns from July of year t to June of t+1. The July 2001 beginning of the study period is chosen to facilitate this matching scheme. Firm size, as measured by market capitalization, is updated on a monthly basis. Finally, we use NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ index returns as the market portfolio returns and one-month Treasury bill yields as the risk-free rates.
Although the SEC uses the $5.00 benchmark price in its definition of penny stocks, we must proceed with caution in identifying penny stocks. We adopt two selection rules. First, at the beginning of each month during the study period, we examine the preceding one-year period to compute the average price for each stock. If the average price of a stock is less than $5.00 per share during this retrospective examination, then the stock in question is regarded as a penny stock. A stock's price may certainly increase beyond $5.00 in the months following this computation; if this stock is subsequently excluded from the penny stock portfolio, the portfolio return may be understated. To address this consideration, introduced is a second rule that states that once a penny stock is identified, we grant it a one-year grace period; during this grace period, the stock remains a penny stock regardless of its price. As a result, we have identified a total of 1,054 penny stocks. To confirm the robustness of our results and to examine the effects of price level on stock performance, we construct three portfolios of penny stocks: (i) penny portfolio 1 (Price ≤ $1) of 144 stocks; (ii) penny portfolio 2 ($1 < Price ≤ $3) of 505 stocks; and (iii) penny portfolio 3 ($3 < Price ≤ $5) of 405 stocks. To avoid the over-and under-estimation of portfolio returns, the one-year averaging rule and the one-year grace period rule remain applicable to all component stocks of the three portfolios. In addition, in view of the observation by Ang et al.
(2013), we have eliminated penny stocks that are also traded in the OTC market to narrow down to a set of clean sample of listed penny stocks.
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We also create three portfolios of listed non-penny stocks. The comparison between listed pennies with high-priced stocks may not be a meaningful exercise; thus, we identify lowpriced listed stocks that are traded between $5.00 and $15.00. The one-year averaging rule and the one-year grace period rule are also applied to low-priced, non-penny stocks. A to highkight of 1,320 non-penny stocks is identified. To compare these non-penny stocks with the three penny stock portfolios, we also create three non-penny stock portfolios: (i) non-penny portfolio 1 ($5 < Price ≤ $8) with 476 stocks; (ii) non-penny portfolio 2 ($8 < Price ≤ $11) of 380 stocks; and (iii) non-penny portfolio 3 ($11 < Price < $15) of 464 stocks.
We also identify a total of 2,202 high-priced non-penny stocks. Three portfolios are also created depending on average prices, using the same averaging rule and the one-year grace period rule: (i) high-priced portfolio 1 ($15 < P ≤ $25) with 893 stocks; (ii) high-priced portfolio 2 ($25 < P ≤ $40) with 763 stocks; and (iii) high-priced portfolio 3 ($40 < P) of 546 stocks.
B. Characteristics of Penny Stocks
Panel A of Table I reports the returns and prices of penny stocks, low-priced non-penny stocks, and high-priced non-penny stocks. For each subgroup, we have three portfolios each.
During the study period, a total of 4,572 common stocks are listed on the three exchanges, including 1,054 penny stocks, 1,316 low-priced non-penny stocks, and 2,202 high-priced nonpenny stocks. The average share prices are $2.59 for the penny stocks, $9.58 for the low-priced non-penny stocks, and $122.92 for the high-priced non-penny stocks. Penny portfolio 1 contains a total of 144 component stocks and featured an average share price of $0.67. This average may appear unusual given the $1.00-delisting rule that has been imposed by the three exchanges since September 1991; however, average price below $1.00 is possible because a grace period (of 60 days or longer) is granted to listed stocks that trade below $1.00 per share and because the stock exchanges occasionally lift their delisting rules in response to market conditions. 8 For example, this rule was suspended between October 2008 and July 2009.
[Insert Table I] 8 Please refer to Rhee and Wu (2012) for more details regarding the $1.00 delisting rules.
The equally-weighted (EW) average returns are 1.75%, 0.96%, and 0.86% per month for penny stocks, low-priced non-penny stocks, and high-priced non-penny stocks, respectively, during the one-month holding period (month t) that immediately follows the portfolio formation (which occurs at month t-1).
The annualized return for penny stocks is 23.14%, which dramatically contrasts with the large negative returns (-31% to -38%) reported by Eraker and
Ready (2014) for unlisted OTC penny stocks. The EW returns in month t and month t-1 indicate that return momentum exists for all three subgroups at varying degrees.
The last three columns of Panel A report the statistics on institutional holdings. These data are from the Thomson/CDA database. 9 On average, penny stocks have 36 institutional investors, while each of the firms in penny portfolios 1, 2, and 3 has 17, 29, and 50 institutional investors, respectively. By contrast, the low-priced non-penny firms and the high-priced nonpenny firms have 91 and 252 institutional investors, respectively. The average percentage of a firm's stock that is held by institutional investors are 29%, 54%, and 252 for penny stocks, lowpriced non-penny stocks, and high-priced non-penny stocks, respectively. This average percentage increases from 13% for penny portfolio 1 to 63% for high-priced non-penny portfolio 1, demonstrating that institutional investment increases with share prices. In general, these findings are consistent with observations by Bennet, Sias, and Starks (2003) and Blume and Keim (2011) that institutional investors have shifted their preference away from large, conservative stocks and towards smaller, riskier stocks since the 1990s.
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We summarize the risk and liquidity measures of the penny and non-penny stocks in Panel B of Table I . Dimson's (1979) beta is estimated for these stocks because they are Firm size is measured by market capitalization. The average market capitalization of the penny stocks is $138 million; by contrast, the average market capitalizations for the low-priced non-penny stocks is $579 million and $5,745 million for the high-priced non-pennies. Firm size is positively related to price level; high-priced stocks typically exhibit larger market capitalization.
The average BM ratio of the penny stocks is higher than the average BM ratios of the non-penny stocks.
Illiquidity problems such as large bid-ask bounces and high transaction costs are particularly severe for penny stocks. To assess the poor liquidity of penny stocks, we calculate four metrics: (i) the percentage of zero-return days; 11 (ii) the Amihud (2002) measure; (iii) the Hasbrouck measure of the Gibbs effective transaction costs; and (iv) the Corwin-Schultz (2012) bid-ask estimate using daily high and low prices.
On average, the penny and non-penny stocks exhibit zero returns on 12.05%, 9.06%, and 7.61% of trading days, respectively. 12 On the basis of the Amihud (2002) liquidity measure, the degree of illiquidity of penny stocks is dramatically exhibited, approximately more than ten times 11 Ang et al. (2011) use the proportion of non-trading days to measure the degree of illiquidity.
greater than the degree of illiquidity of low-priced non-penny stocks (8.32 vs. 0.76). 13 This measure declines as the price level increases; in particular, penny portfolio 1 demonstrates an
Amihud ratio of 29.58, whereas high-priced non-penny portfolio 3 has the ratio of 0.05.
Hasbrouck (2009) advocates the use of the Gibbs effective transaction cost as an alternative measure of liquidity. The Hasbrouck measure can be estimated from daily data during the calendar year and exhibit a high correlation with the bid-ask spread. 14 To accurately estimate these costs, stocks of interest must be traded on at least 50 trading days during a particular calendar year. The Gibbs effective transaction cost is a Bayesian version of Roll's (1984) transaction cost metric. 15 The Gibbs effective transaction cost of penny stocks is 1.38% of their share price, whereas the Gibbs effective transaction costs are only 0.67% and 0.37% of the share price for low-priced and high-priced non-penny stocks. Gibbs round-trip transaction costs are greatest for penny portfolio 1 (at 2.42% of share price) and lowest for high-priced non-penny portfolio 3 (at 0.27% of share price). 16 This extreme illiquidity among listed penny stocks allows us to examine: (i) the role of illiquidity as an additional factor in the asset pricing model framework; and (ii) the implications for short-sale based arbitrage in the later sections.
We use the Corwin and Schultz (2012) method of estimating bid-ask spreads using daily high and low prices. Their bid-ask spread estimates exhibit a cross-sectional correlation of 0.732 with high 13 The Amihud (2002) . The advantage of this measure is that it can be calculated for days involving no price changes, which occur relatively frequently for penny stocks. A low value for this metric implies high liquidity by indicating that large trading volumes can be accommodated with small price changes; by contrast, a high value of this metric implies low liquidity by indicating that a large volume cannot be absorbed without a large price change.
frequency TAQ effective spreads in the post-decimalization period which is comparable to our study period. The last column presents high-low spreads. Penny [non-penny] stocks show the average spread of 2.57% [1.41% and 0.91%]. The bid-ask spread estimates declines as the price level increases, ranging from 4.21% for penny portfolio 1 with $0 < P ≤ $1 to 0.73% for highpriced non-penny portfolio 3 with $40 < P.
II. Are High Abnormal Returns of Penny Stocks Justified?
We construct the EW monthly average excess returns on penny and non-penny portfolios to run the time-series regressions against each of one factor, Fama and French's (1993) three factors, Carhart's (1997) four factors, and five factors including illiquidity whereas equation (1) presents a full five-factor model.
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The main purposes for gradually introducing one factor through five factors are to illustrate: (i) the change in the magnitude of estimated alphas; (ii) (ILLIQ t 
where r p ,t is the excess return on the portfolio of penny stocks or non-penny stocks at month t, MKT is the market excess return, SMB is the difference between the return on a portfolio of small-cap stocks and the return on a portfolio of large-cap stocks (the size premium), HML is the difference between the return on a portfolio that is composed of high BM stocks and the return on a portfolio that is composed of low BM stocks (the value premium), and UMD is the difference between the return on a portfolio that is composed of stocks with high returns from t -12 to t -2 and the return on a portfolio that is composed of stocks with low returns from t -12 to t -2 (the momentum premium). ILLIQ is the aggregate liquidity risk factor which is constructed based on the Gibbs effective transaction costs. We divide all of common stocks into five portfolios based on their Gibbs effective transaction cost measures, as described in Hasbrouck (2009). ILLIQ is constructed using the difference between the return on the portfolio with highest transaction cost (lowest liquidity) stocks and the return on the portfolio with lowest transaction cost (highest liquidity) stocks. The data of RM-RF, SMB, HML, and UMD are from Kenneth French's website.
Three major findings emerge from the results of time-series regressions compiled in Table II .
A. Portfolio Alpha
Portfolio alphas estimated for the penny stocks as a whole are 1.15 for the single-factor model, 0.70 for the three-factor model, and 0.75 for the four-factor model, and 0.01 for the fivefactor model. The low-priced non-penny stocks exhibit a similar trend: their alphas are: 0.35 for the one-factor model, 0.05 for three-factor model, 0.07 for the four-factor model, and -0.08 for the five-factor model. These alpha values are not significant. Three sub-group portfolios show similar patterns regardless whether they are low-priced or high-priced non-pennies.
[Insert Table II] Although penny stocks earn abnormal returns relative to the single-factor model, it remains premature to conclude that penny stocks are truly profitable. In fact, in the presence of high transaction costs, profitable investment strategies may not be economically feasible [Amihud and Mendelson (1986 ), Brennan et al. (1998 ), and Datar et al. (1998 ].
B. R-square Values
Adjusted R-square values of the five-factor models range from 64% to 97% for penny stocks, exhibiting the critical role of illiquidity in the asset pricing models. An interesting contrast is observed between penny stocks and non-penny stocks. For the entire penny stocks, a total of 97% of return variations are explained by five factors; this percentage is a significant increase from 75% of return variations explained by four factors, illustrating the critical role of illiquidity in explaining the return variations.
R-square values estimated for the non-penny stocks, however, show a different picture.
Fama and French's three factors and Carhart's four factors already explain 91% and 92% of return variations. As a result, the addition of the illiquidity factor contributes very little in increasing the R-square value. Likewise, the high-priced non-penny stocks show similar patterns.
We observe that penny stocks load heavily and positively on the liquidity factor: the coefficients of this factor are strongly significant in all of the regressions for the penny stocks as a whole and for penny portfolios 1, 2, and 3, indicating that penny stocks are extremely illiquid. After the illiquidity factor is included in the four-factor model, the intercepts of all penny stock portfolios become very small and insignificant. More importantly, the new five-factor model demonstrates a substantially increased adjusted R-square value relative to prior models; in particular, a total of 97% of the return variations of all penny stocks are explained by the five-factor model, whereas the conventional four-factor model explains only 75% of these variations. The results from the penny portfolios reveal that liquidity risk is very important for understanding the high returns of penny stocks. All three of the examined penny portfolios demonstrate similar results to the penny stocks as a whole.
In summary, we document that the five-factor model can explain the returns of the penny stock portfolios very well, whereas the additional liquidity factor contributes very little to the characterization of the non-penny stock portfolios. We conclude that the positive abnormal returns of penny stocks from the conventional models are largely explained by the absence of the liquidity factor from these models. Penny stocks do not earn abnormal returns after this additional risk factor is incorporated into model estimations.
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III. Penny Stock Trading Strategies
In this section, we examine whether investors can make abnormal profits from penny stocks and non-penny stocks by employing the zero-cost investment strategies instead of holding long positions in all penny stocks, as assumed in the asset pricing model framework. We are particularly interested in three characteristics that are common among penny stocks: idiosyncratic risk, institutional ownership, and short interest. The results are summarized in Table III investors may possess superb stock selection skills and information advantages relative to individual investors.
[Insert Table III] The last column presents the results for the zero-cost portfolios constructed on the basis short interest. Interestingly, abnormal returns are found for only penny stock portfolios but not for low-or high-priced non-penny stock portfolios. This finding contradicts those compiled by Desai, Ramesh, Thiagarajan, and Balachandran (2002), Gopalan (2003) , Boehmer, Jones, and
Zhang (2008): these studies largely focus on high-priced non-penny stocks. Our finding, however, is consistent with Boehme, Danielson, and Sorescu (2006) in the sense that the presence of short-sale constraints alone is not sufficient to cause underperformance. Boehme et al. (2006) suggest that both short-sale constraints and dispersion of investor opinion must be analyzed jointly; otherwise stocks are not systematically overvalued when either of the two conditions is not met.
Another interesting point is that the majority of reported profits are positive for penny stocks and high-priced non-penny stocks, which contradicts the general perception that stocks with high short interest experience negative abnormal returns eventually due to overvaluation given short-sale constraints. Boehmer, Huszar, and Jordan (2010) consider these positive abnormal returns as "the good news" in short interest because they observe this trend among high-volume and low-short interest stocks. Interestingly, we observe the same positive returns among penny stocks known for low-volume, which reminds us of a number of unresolved issues in relation to short interest. We should also pay special attention to what Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter (2005) observe to understand why short interest is not the underlying force which provides significant abnormal profits to investors; Asquith et al (2005) find that institutional ownership is greater than short interest for over 95% of stocks, which means that short-sale constraints are not common. Penny stocks in our sample are no exceptions with the supply of securities to be shorted (as indicted by institutional ownership) far exceeds the demand for securities shorted (as proxied by short interest).
As a result, we should re-visit Boehme et al.'s (2006) observation that short interest cannot be considered alone to justify for arbitrage profits. Naturally, the interaction between short interest and dispersion of investor opinion has to be considered simultaneously. For penny stocks, it is difficult to use dispersion of financial analysts' earnings forecast due to limited availability even though it is the commonly used proxy in the past [Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) , Danielsen and Sorescu (2001) , and Boehe et al. (2006)]. Another proxy variable is the turnover measure, but we refrain from using it because turnover is a variable which may capture many additional aspects beyond differences in investor opinion. Fortunately, we can use idiosyncratic volatility as a proxy for dispersion of investor opinion [Boehme et al. (2006) ]. The interaction of three key characteristics: idiosyncratic volatility, short interest, and institutional ownership is the subject of our analysis in the next section.
IV. The Interaction of Idiosyncratic Volatility, Short Interest, and Institutional Ownership
A. Short Interest and Institutional Ownership
Panel A of Table IV presents Focusing on the first group with a low short interest and a low institutional ownership, this result can be interpreted as a strong support of the investor recognition hypothesis of Merton (1987) .
To test Merton's (1987) one of unresolved short-selling puzzles; why there seems to be so little short-selling.
As we move to the low-priced non-pennies summarized in column (3), the results differ from those of penny stocks. Overvaluation becomes more common for the low-priced nonpennies than the penny stocks as we observe from the first, second, and fourth subgroups. The third subgroup shows undervalued situation, but estimated alphas are no longer significant. As far as low-priced non-pennies are concernd, overvalution of the second subgroup remains the same as penny stocks, with significant, negative alpha values for one-, three-, and six-month holding periods. No more significant undervaluation is observed for the first and third subgroups with the low level of short interest. Interestingly, the fourth subgroup with high institutional ownership and high short interest exhibits as significant overvaluation as the second subgroups.
High-priced non-pennies also exhibit a different picture from that we observe from penny 21 Earlier studies by Falkenstein (1996) and Aggarwal, Klapper, and Wysocki (2005) use institutional ownership as a measure of firm visibility.
22 Chen et al. (2002) also emphasize the importance of institutional ownership in short-sale constraints. They use the number of institutions to capture this effect. They present evidence that during 1979-1998 the change in the number of mutual funds holding a stock is positively related to subsequent stock returns.
stocks: First, overvaluation of the second subgroup is no longer valid. Rather, undervaluation becomes common for not only the second subgroup but also first and fourth subgroups. What we observe from these high-priced stocks contradicts the results of Asquith et al. (2005) because the second subgroup are short-sale constrained with high short interest and low institutional ownership and they are expected to underperform. But that is not what we observe.
B. Short Interest and Idiosyncratic Risk
Panel B of Table IV presents the results of the interaction between short interest and idiosyncratic volatility, in which both short-sale constraints and divergence of investor opinions are simultaneously considered as suggested by Boehme et al. (2006) . When evaluated alone, both idiosyncratic risk and short interest provide significant zero-cost portfolio returns as shown in Table III . When both firm characteristics are considered jointly, the results are not as strong.
Under the normal circumstances, one would expect that the fourth subgroup with high short interest and high divergence of opinions (as proxied by high idiosyncratic volatility) would cause arbitrage activities meaningful, but none of the five holding periods show significant alpha values for penny stocks. The estimated alphas are all negative, which is an indication of overvaluation as predicted by Boehme et al. (2006) . Surprisingly, the first, second, and third subgroups of Low-priced non-penny stocks show all negatve alpha estimates, indicating the overvalued situation in all 2x2 matrix. Significant alpha estimates are found in the third and fourth subgroups with high idiosyncratic risk. Unlike the high-priced non-penny stocks, idiosyncratic risk is dominant over short interest. Further research will be needed to identify the reasons.
C. Idiosyncratic Volatility and Institutional Ownership
The interaction between idiosyncratic volatility and institutional ownership presented in Panel C yields the most dramatic results. First of all, among the potential limits-to-arbitrage proxies we consider, idiosyncratic volatility and institutional ownership demonstrate the most significant effects on arbitrage activities by exhibiting both over-and under-valuation of penny stocks. For example, the first subgroup with low idiosyncratic volatility and low institutional ownership shows extreme undervalued situation with abnormal profits ranging from 89 basis points (three-month holding period) to 65 basis points (nine-month holding period). We also observe the magnitude of undervaluation does not quickly dissipate as the holding period lengthens. Second, the third and fourth subgroups of penny stocks also exhibit positive alpha estimates as an indication of undervaluation. Even if divergence of investor opinions at a relatively lower level (as evidenced by low idiosyncratic volatility), institutional ownership emerges as a major constraint to make the arbitrage more difficult than usual. As a result, arbitrage profits are shown regardless of the level of institutional ownership.
High-priced non-penny stocks, however, exhibit undervaluation in all four subgroups while significant alpha estimates are obtained for the first subgroup with low institutional ownership and low idiosyncratic volatility.
[Insert Table IV] From the results summarized in Table IV , at least three major findings emerge. First, the traditional notion that heavily shorted stocks experience significant negative returns is not supported among listed penny stocks. Second, institutional ownership plays a key role in valuation of penny stocks. The levels of institutional ownership do matter as we observe undervalued situation among penny stocks. This result may be indication that institutional investors may be better informed than others. Idiosyncratic volatility alone does not appear to be a significant factor in determining arbitrage profits among penny stocks, but once it is combined with institutional ownership, the joint effects become noticeable.
V. Conclusion
Although many industry practitioners believe that penny stocks are high-risk, highreward investments, there is limited academic research to support this view. This paper comprehensively examines the characteristics and pricing behaviors of penny stocks. Our efforts are valuable because at least 25 percent of US listed stocks are penny stocks that are traded below $5.00 per share.
Penny stocks are characterized by high return, high beta, high BM ratio, high idiosyncratic volatility, and low liquidity. Our time series analyses suggest that penny stocks do not earn abnormal positive profits in the five-factor asset pricing model framework (which includes the factors of size, BM, momentum, and liquidity). However, penny stocks with high institutional ownership generate significant abnormal returns, whereas penny stocks with low institutional ownership do not produce these abnormal returns. We conduct further analyses to investigate whether popular investment strategies for non-penny stocks that have been developed on the basis of firm characteristics are effective for penny stocks. Although the aggregate penny stock portfolio does not earn abnormal returns in the context of the five-factor model, investors can nonetheless realize abnormal profits from penny stocks through the use of certain characteristics-based investment strategies. We have considered idiosyncratic volatility, institutional ownership, and short interest to evaluate over-or under-valuation penny stocks. This
This study represents only an initial foray that must be followed by future research to elucidate the characteristics and valuation of listed penny stocks.
Boehme, Rodney D., Bartley R. Danielsen, and Sorin M. Sorescu, 2006, Short-sale constraints,
Table I Characteristics of Penny and Non-Penny Stocks
This table reports the characteristics of penny stock portfolios and low-priced non-penny stock portfolios. We adopt two decision rules. First, at the beginning of each month during the study period, we look back the past one-year period to compute the average price for each stock. If the average price of a stock is below $5, then it is considered a penny stock. It is quite possible that its price moves up beyond $5 in the following months. The exclusion of this stock from the penny stock portfolio may understate the portfolio return. Hence, the second rule is introduced. Once a penny stock is identified, we give it a oneyear grace period. During this grace period, it remains as a penny stock. To confirm the robustness of our results and to examine the effect of price level on stock performance, we construct three portfolios of penny stocks: (i) penny portfolio 1 (Price ≤ $1); penny portfolio 2 ($1 < Price ≤ $3); and penny portfolio 3 ($3 < Price ≤ $5). The one-year averaging rule and the one-year grace period rule remain applicable to the three portfolios based on sorts on price per share of component stocks to avoid the over-and under-estimation of portfolio returns. To make the comparison between penny and non-penny stocks more meaningful, we identify low-priced non-penny stocks if their prices are between $5.00 and $15.00. The one-year averaging rule and the one-year grace period rule are also applied to non-penny stocks. To compare with three penny stock portfolios, we create three low-priced non-penny stock portfolios: (i) non-penny portfolio 1 ($5≤ Price ≤ $8); non-penny portfolio 2 ($8≤ Price ≤ $11); and non-penny portfolio 3 ($11≤ Price < $15). We also identify a total of 2,202 high-priced non-penny stocks. Three portfolios are also created depending on average prices, using the same averaging rule and the one-year grace period rule: (i) high-priced portfolio 1 ($15 < P ≤ $25); (ii) high-priced portfolio 2 ($25 < P ≤ $40); and (iii) high-priced portfolio 3 ($40 < P). 
where, r p , t is the excess return on the portfolio of penny stocks or non-penny stocks, MKT is the market excess return, SMB is the difference between the return on a portfolio of small-cap stocks and the return on a portfolio of large-cap stocks (the size premium), HML is the difference between the return on a portfolio comprised of high BM stocks and the return on a portfolio comprised of low BM stocks (the value premium), and UMD is the difference between the return on a portfolio comprised of stocks with high returns from t -12 to t -2 and the return on a portfolio comprised of stocks with low returns from t -12 to t -2 (the momentum premium). We also run the following five-factor model:
r p,t = α p + β MKT (MKT t ) + β SMB (SMB t ) + β HML (HML t ) + β UMD (UMD t ) + β LIQ (LIQ t ) + ε p,t ,
The additional independent variable is liquidity factor (LIQ). The data of RM-RF, SMB, HML, momentum factor (UMD) are from French's website. LIQ is the aggregate liquidity risk factor which is constructed based on Gibbs effective transaction cost. We divide all of common stocks into five portfolios based on their Gibbs effective transaction cost, as described in Hasbrouck (2009). LIQ is constructed using the difference between the return on the portfolio with highest transaction cost (lowest liquidity) stocks and the return on the portfolio with lowest transaction cost (highest liquidity) stocks. The Newey-West (1987) robust t-statistics are reported in square brackets. +, *, and **, denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Newey-West standard errors with six lags are used to adjust for autocorrelation. We construct trading strategies based on J = one-month formation period and K-month holding periods where K = one-, three-, six-, nine-and 12-month periods. At time t, we sort penny stocks into quintile portfolios according to their three major characteristics (idiosyncratic risk, institutional ownership, and short interest) and we then hold these portfolios for the next K-months. The portfolios are rebalanced each month; moreover, after the portfolios are formed, the EW return of each portfolio is calculated every month in percentage terms over the course of different holding periods. Subsequently, we run the timeseries regressions of the excess returns on each quintile portfolio against the 5-factor model and report the abnormal returns of zero-cost portfolios under each trading strategy. The average monthly abnormal returns are the differences in abnormal returns of two quintile portfolios with largest and smallest firm-level characteristics. The Newey and West (1987) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent t-statistics are computed for the significance tests. The same procedures are repeated for low-priced non-penny stocks. Table IV . Limits-to-Arbitrage
At time t, we construct trading strategies based on J = one-month formation period and K-month holding periods where K = one-, three-, six-, nine-and 12-month periods. We first sort penny stocks (or low-priced non-penny stocks or high-priced non-penny stocks) into two portfolios according to their short interest ratio (shares shorted divided by shares outstanding), then within each short interest portfolio, sort penny stocks into two portfolios according to institutional ownership. We then hold those four portfolios for the next Kmonths where K = one-, three-, six-, nine-, and 12-months. The portfolios are rebalanced each month and after the portfolios are formed, the EW return of each portfolio is calculated every month in percentage terms over different holding periods. Then we run the time-series regressions of the excess returns on each portfolio against the 5-factor model and report estimated alphas as shown in Panel A. The Newey and West (1987) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent t-statistics are computed for the significance tests. The same procedures are repeated for sorting of stocks based on short interest and idiosyncratic volatility as shown in Panel B and sorting of stocks based on idiosyncratic volatility and institutional ownership as shown in Panel C.
